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1.  Introduction and Literature Review 
On September 30, 2007, Ukraine’s pro-Western parties won a parliamentary majority.  
The election’s results confirmed the pro-Western consensus of the Orange Revolution—the 
November 2004 election in which Viktor Yushchenko took power after hundreds of thousands of 
Ukrainians protested pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych’s electoral victory.  Western states have 
repeatedly looked on Ukraine’s elections as an opportunity for it to prove its commitment to 
democracy.  Though the Orange Revolution instated a Western-leaning president, allegations of 
vote-rigging that prompted the “Revolution” made the democratic system seem unreliable.  The 
September elections will surely affect the way foreign powers look upon Ukraine, while the 
country’s attitudes toward East and West continue to be established.  Whether Ukraine will 
ultimately find a stable position in Western institutions (such as NATO, the WTO, or the 
European Union) is unclear as of yet. 
As a primarily economic actor with limited political or military power, the EU has relied 
on enlargement as its chief foreign policy tool, widening its economic scope by offering 
membership to less politically and economically stable neighbors.  Offering the “carrot” of 
member state status and the associated benefits of market access, monetary union membership, a 
common external border, and some political solidarity, the EU has successfully spread its 80,000 
pages of common laws (acquis communautaire) and induced political and economic reforms in 
each of its acceding member states.  Indeed, accession arrangements undoubtedly provided 
motivation for the EU’s newest Central and Eastern European members’ rapid transitions from 
Soviet to market economies.  Even without formal accession, the prospect of EU membership 
has induced reforms in some surrounding states, such as Turkey.  Offered the incentive of 
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accession to the EU, Turkey instituted various political reforms, including the abolition of capital 
punishment and improvement in rights for its Kurdish population. 
Under the stipulations of EU treaties, enlargement cannot proceed further until the EU 
adopts a constitution, which has proven a slow and contentious process since the constitution 
was rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005.  Additionally, citizens and politicians have lost 
energy to pursue enlargement and are grappling with the need to deepen ties among current 
member states.  Due to this sense of “enlargement fatigue,” it is unlikely that enlargement will 
proceed further in the near future.  Since the 2004 EU enlargement (Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and 2007 
enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania), the EU’s foreign policy has focused on offering a different 
set of incentives to its neighbors that does not include full EU membership.  Figure 1 shows a 
map of the EU as of 2007. 
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Figure 1: Map of the European Union, 2007: EU member states are shown in yellow.  States 
that already have open accession agreements with the EU and are in the process of achieving 
membership are shown in dark blue.  Here we see that Ukraine is poised on the EU’s eastern 
border and shares a long border with Russia. 
(Source: www.europa.eu) 
 
The EU in 2004 instituted the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a system of 
privileged relationships with its 16 immediate neighbors, based on a “mutual commitment to 
common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy 
principles and sustainable development)” (Commission, 2007c, ¶ 3).  These “neighbor states” 
include some that do not fall under the geographic definition of “Europe,” such as the Palestinian 
Authority, which will never have the prospect of EU membership, and some states such as 
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Ukraine that could potentially be offered EU membership someday.  Under the ENP, the EU and 
each neighbor country create a bilateral ENP Action Plan, which establishes political and 
economic reform priorities for the neighbors. 
The ENP is merely a variation of the enlargement foreign policy tool; rather than full 
membership, the ENP offers deeper economic ties without institutional participation.  That is, the 
ENP does not offer membership in the EU’s decision-making bodies.  Successful 
implementation of the Action Plan will result in negotiation of an Agreement on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products in key sectors (Burakovsky, et. al., 2006).  
Kelley (2006) argues that drafts of the Action Plans were based directly on the Association 
Agreements for the 2004 enlargement; both schemes have similar requirements for economic and 
political liberalization and offer the incentive of integration with the EU.  The ENP offers 
neighbor states “the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and 
liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital” 
(Commission, 2003, p. 4).  Thus, the ENP Action Plans go beyond what has been offered 
through bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, which laid the framework for future 
political and economic cooperation between the EU and bilateral partners.  By promising free 
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital, the EU is essentially offering everything 
except institutional membership to the neighborhood states and precluding their participation in 
the European Monetary Union (common currency area) (Haukkala, 2007). 
Ukraine, one of the states with which the EU has an ENP Action plan, has repeatedly 
expressed an interest in EU membership but has been denied the possibility of opening an 
Association Agreement, the first step toward membership negotiations (Molchanov, 2004).  At 
the very least, Ukraine repeatedly indicates its supposed interest in Europeanization.  In 1998, 
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the president issued a Decree on Strategy for Ukraine’s Integration into the EU, tasking the 
government with meeting membership preconditions by 2007, and in 2003, the President formed 
a National Council for Approximation of the Legislation of Ukraine to that of the European 
Union (Molchanov, 2004).  Oleksandr Chalyy, a senior aide to President Viktor Yushchenko, 
stressed Ukraine’s European orientation in September 2007: “Anchoring our political future to a 
united Europe is our top strategic priority….The key point of such policy must be to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria [EU entry rules] –unilaterally, if necessary—within a 10-year timescale,” 
(Runner, 2007, ¶ 10).  Therefore, exclusion from the accession process as a member of the EU’s 
“neighborhood” is disappointing to Ukraine.  Ukraine’s ambassador to the EU said in 2007 that 
the ENP without a membership perspective “cannot be accepted as an adequate basis for EU-
Ukrainian relations,” (Vucheva, ¶ 6).   
This paper examines the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine and studies whether the ENP 
provides strong enough incentives to induce the social and democratic reforms desired by the EU 
and demanded by the ENP Action Plans.  We examine the incentives schemes at work in the 
Action Plans and assess the impact of the ENP on trade as well as economic and political 
reforms in Ukraine.  We analyze Ukraine’s incentives for pursuing its Action Plan and its 
success in doing so to date in order to assess the ENP as in institution that could bring about 
democratic reform there.  Institution of the ENP has not significantly affected Ukraine’s 
economic and political development due to insufficient incentives inherent in the Action Plan 
and due to the riskiness of pursuing the Action Plan. 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides a framework through which we can 
understand the ENP as an institution and its effectiveness in motivating action for Ukraine.  NIE 
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can be used to assess various components of an institution, such as its incentives regime, 
information asymmetries, the motives of actors, monitoring mechanisms, and conditionality. 
One branch of NIE, principal-agent theory, examines the motives of an economically 
powerful actor (the “principal”) and a less powerful actor (the “agent”) to reveal an optimal 
contractual arrangement between the two.  Agents operate under an “incentive constraint,” 
meaning they must have sufficient motivation to undertake the action specified in the contract, 
according to their own preferences.  An agent’s opportunity cost (or “reservation utility”) in 
pursuing the course of action must also be considered.  An optimal contract will yield the highest 
possible return to the principal while meeting the agent’s reservation utility and incentive 
constraint (Ray, 1998).  An optimal Action Plan, therefore, will lead Ukraine to become a 
member of the EU common market while providing sufficient incentive for the Ukraine to carry 
out the Action Plan and ally with Europe. 
Lessons from foreign aid programs can be applied to the ENP to demonstrate some of its 
potential weaknesses.  Paul (2006) examined the nature of foreign aid relationships and the 
incentive problems involved.  Aid contracts are subject to information asymmetries, as the 
motives of both donor and recipient are unclear and likely diverge.  An analysis of the motives of 
the EU and Ukraine is needed before we can determine whether the ENP adequately aligns the 
two actors’ motives.  Strategic behavior may arise as recipients might not use aid for its intended 
purpose, and adverse selection may occur if recipients conceal information about their motives or 
capacity for change.  Ray (1998) identifies “hidden action” as a specific type of informational 
problem in which one party in a transaction may not have any incentive to follow through with 
the actions stipulated under the contract because the action is not publicly observable.  For 
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instance, Ukraine may attain closer integration with the EU without undertaking the necessary 
reforms if integration does not appear to be clearly contingent on its adoption of the Action Plan. 
To mediate these potential problems, a monitoring mechanism is important to ensure that 
a contractual agreement is fulfilled.  Conditionality can help alleviate moral hazard by requiring 
evidence of improvement in order to receive additional benefits; that is, rewards should not be 
guaranteed but should be contingent on the level of effort put forth.  Institutional failure in 
developing countries is widely cited as a hindrance to development aid’s effectiveness; 
corruption and poor infrastructure, for instance, can keep aid from reaching its targeted 
recipients.  In fact, Herath (2005) asserts that institutions are so important as to be the “primary 
reasons for differences in economic performance” (p. 879).  Thorbecke (2000) thus recommends 
process conditionality and political monitoring to ensure aid effectiveness.  Conditionality also 
allows donor countries to achieve political motives; they provide aid in an attempt to reach 
foreign policy goals, while seeking political support from recipients (Paul, 2006).  We will assess 
the extent to which conditionality operates within the ENP as a way to uncover whether the ENP 
will successfully motivate political and economic reform in Ukraine. 
3.  Data and Analysis 
In principal-agent theory, an economically powerful actor such as the EU (the 
“principal”) creates contracts with “agents” (like Ukraine) to best serve its own interests and 
reduce the agent’s moral hazard (Ray, 1998).  The EU controls access to its market and so can 
dictate the terms of the Action Plans, providing incentives schemes and conditional agreements.  
The EU is also politically stronger than the neighbor states (Raik, 2006).  This justifies our 
categorization of the EU as the “principal” in the principal-agent framework analysis of the ENP.  
Here, we use principal-agent theory to analyze the effectiveness of the ENP. 
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3.1 The Actors and their Motives. 
3.1a The European Union 
The EU’s 27 member states form a common market.  With a GDP of nearly 16 trillion 
dollars, it is the world’s largest economy (IMF, 2007).  The ENP is a policy of Westernization on 
European terms, with the goal of fostering stable, pro-European regimes in the EU’s 
neighborhood.  Part of the EU’s motivation for providing aid and encouraging reform in its 
“neighborhood” is to create political and economic stability at its borders.  The EU seeks to 
create allies in its sphere of influence without enlarging, increasing cooperation at its borders 
without going through the difficult process of extending EU membership.  In neo-realistic 
thinking, cooperative institutions such as the ENP contribute to donor security by promoting 
democracy, human rights, and low military spending (Zanger, 2000); institutions of regional 
cooperation have replaced accession agreements as the EU’s means of fostering stability in its 
neighborhood.  Specifically, by drawing countries into its sphere of influence, the EU can gain 
support for foreign policy objectives such as crisis management operations (Tassinari, 2007).  
Thus, the EU seeks to promote shared values, and economic integration is clearly contingent on 
adoption of these “shared values,” or the EU’s values.  Kelley (2006) cites a European 
Commission official stating: “The countries that push more shared values will get priority in 
financial support, greater and speedier access to the internal market” (¶ 16). 
Minimizing Russian influence in Eastern Europe is also an important strategic goal for 
the EU, because Russian influence may foster economic instability and authoritarianism rather 
than liberal reform.  Specific security threats that the EU sees in Russia are nuclear weapons, 
access to Caspian Sea oil and gas, and terrorism (Legvold, 2004).  Russia cut off gas supplies to 
Ukraine in January 2006 and again threatened to do so in October 2007, amid speculation that 
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these actions could have been connected to the Orange Revolution and Ukraine’s elections.  
Many European countries were affected by the gas cut-off; reducing reliance on Russia for oil is 
thus important for strategic reasons.  Russian influence is an important consideration for the EU 
in offering integration with Ukraine, which has strong historical, cultural, and ethic ties to Russia 
and shares a long border with Russia.  Strengthening Ukraine creates a buffer against Russian 
influence and aggression, whereas making Ukraine a member of the EU would extend the EU’s 
growing border with Russia. 
The EU also has economic motives for integrating with its neighbors.  Stronger neighbors 
are better trading partners and require less aid.  By contributing to the economic strength of its 
neighbors, the EU reduces the likelihood that its neighbors will experience an economic crisis 
that affects the EU or requires the EU to intervene.  With the 2004 EU enlargement, Ukraine’s 
economic security became more relevant to the EU because Ukraine is now at the EU’s eastern 
border (Legvold, 2004).   
In some ways, it is not accurate to speak of the EU as a singular actor with one set of 
motives.  As an organization of 27 member states, the EU makes many of its decisions through 
intergovernmental processes.  The differing motives of the member states make it difficult for 
the EU to act with one common voice, particularly in the realm of foreign politics.  The EU’s 
newer members are more in favor of enlargement, with Poland particularly interested in making 
Ukraine a member of the EU, whereas older members of the EU are not as receptive to 
enlargement.  This contentiousness impacts Ukraine’s integration prospects; some states may be 
resistant to the idea of allowing Ukraine to enter the common market and may block the decision 
in the end, despite the ENP’s promise of access to the common market.  Political resistance 
within the EU also makes enlargement unlikely. 
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Instead of applying economic pressure, such as tariffs or embargos, the EU attempts to 
promote its foreign policy agenda through soft power, offering economic integration without 
union membership (Kravchenko, 2007).  Enlargement has been the EU’s main tool for this 
purpose; however, the ENP could meet these objective without creating internal political 
resistance and straining the EU’s already cumbersome institutions.   
3.1b Ukraine 
Since the 2004 EU enlargement, the EU has been Ukraine’s largest trading partner, 
accounting for about 32% of Ukraine’s total trade in 2005.  Ukraine’s total trade with the EU 
amounts to about 1.1% of total EU trade.  Iron and steel, mineral products, and chemicals make 
up 64% of Ukrainian exports to the EU, and Ukrainian imports of machinery, equipment, and 
chemicals make up 66% of Ukrainian imports from the EU.  Trade in services between the two 
actors is limited.  The EU imposes quotas on some Ukrainian steel exports, which will be 
abolished if Ukraine joins the WTO. 
Ukraine also has a highly inefficient economy, owing to its previous central control that 
concentrated resources in heavy industry (Goncharuk, 2006).  Goncharuk (2006) found that 
between 1992 and 2004, economic efficiency in Ukraine actually declined by 8.5 percent, and 
the economy experienced inefficient utilization of investment and innovation.  This points to the 
need for Ukraine to reform its economy; it must improve its technological capabilities and 
energy efficiency, demonopolize, increase competition, and reduce state involvement in the 
economy (Goncharuk, 2006).  A study of Ukraine’s economy by the World Bank (2005) found 
that Ukraine’s exports to the EU were constrained more by the domestic business environment 
than by EU trade policies. 
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Ukraine’s investment climate would become more favorable through enforcement of 
legislation and further reforms, resulting in increases in FDI and a reduction in capital flight (EU 
Commission, 2007a).  Ukraine’s economy suffers from an inconsistent regulatory environment, 
corruption, low security of property rights, lax enforcement of contracts, and little protection for 
minority shareholders, all of which discourage foreign direct investment and stifle growth 
(Burakovsky, et. al., 2006). 
Ukraine’s historical, economic, and cultural ties are important to understanding its 
economic and security priorities.  Ukraine is economically dependent on Russia, though the EU 
is now Ukraine’s largest trading partner.  Ukraine is a major exporter of food and industrial 
products to Russia.  Its key imports from Russia are oil and gas, paper, and industrial 
components, and about 80% of Ukrainian businesses depend on these imports from Russia.  This 
dependence makes Ukraine’s economy vulnerable, and diversification is necessary.  Ukraine’s 
strategy is to distance itself from Russia, which it hopes will bring Western financial assistance 
and improve Ukraine’s strategic importance to the West.  To accomplish this, Ukraine has 
redirected trade away from Russia and has declared Europeanization as a goal.  However, 
Russian capital continues to enter Ukraine, sustaining previous power relationships (Wilson, 
2004). 
Legvold (2004) describes how security threats faced by Ukraine are linked to economic 
issues.  Though the threat of a Russian invasion has diminished, Ukrainian leadership still must 
plan for the possibility.  It is more likely that Russia would use its military as leverage in 
diplomatic negotiations, so it is important for Ukraine, a much smaller state with a smaller 
military, to build alliances.  Civil strife and regional conflict are also realistic threats.  Economic 
resources are needed to sustain defense, and the Soviet-era military must be restructured, 
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requiring budgetary outlays.  Finally, Legvold argues that economic reform leads to growth, 
creating socio-economic stability.  For these reasons, Ukraine’s incorporation into the global 
economy and alliance with Europe is strategically important. 
As Ukraine’s political leadership has changed, its commitment to Europeanization has 
fluctuated, making its motives and capacity unclear.  Yushchenko’s two predecessors, Leonid 
Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, “pursued a foreign policy that was confusing, contradictory and 
ideologically empty.  It was not driven by ‘national’ or public interest but simply by the 
objectives and personal interests of Kuchma and his oligarch allies,” (Kuzio, 2006, p. 40).  In 
August 2005, the political crisis that followed the Orange Revolution finally came to an end, as 
President Yushchenko appointed rival Yanukovych prime minister.  Pro-Europe Yushchenko 
retained control over foreign and defense policies, and on August 3, 2006, key government 
leaders, including Yanukovych, agreed to common approaches on major foreign policy issues in 
the Universal Declaration of National Unity.  Theoretically, this agreement committed 
Yanukovych to the pro-EU foreign policy.  However, the level of commitment of Yanukovych 
and his Party of Regions’ to a pro-Western foreign policy is unclear.  In fact, Kuzio (2006) 
argues that Yanukovych’s return as prime minister partially closed the door to Ukraine’s NATO 
membership.  Wolczuk (2006) argues that the uncertainty of Ukraine’s political system, 
especially between the 2004 and 2006 elections, led to slow reform and slow implementation of 
the Action Plan.  Moreover, in the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych’s Party of the 
Regions earned the majority of votes, making it “difficult to formulate foreign policy 
priorities…and to pursue coherent domestic policies to realize these priorities,” (Wolczuk, 2006, 
p. 14).  According to the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s Committee on National 
Security and Defense, Anatoliy Kinakh (2007), new constitutional provisions implemented in 
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2006 redistributed power within the government without laws to address the technicalities of the 
power redistribution.  Thus the balance of power within the Ukrainian government is tenuous, 
limiting the government’s capacity for sustained commitment to reform.  Wolczuk (2006) argues 
that the various parliamentary parties all agree with the goal of European integration but do not 
equally see it as a priority, and changing coalition dynamics and constitutional changes make 
policymaking precarious, impeding implementation of the Action Plan.  Continued political 
reform is thus a necessity for Ukraine. 
Ex-communist elites continue to have a great deal of power in Ukraine and are woven 
into the political structure through co-optation, making economic gains through their connections 
to power (Wolczuk, 2004).  Wolczuk (2006) argues that all parties in the Ukrainian parliament 
are “‘infiltrated’ by business elites,” and business elites are interested in integration with the EU 
only as it benefits their interests.  Industrial output is also dominated by financial industrial 
groups with connections to government.  This “insider economy” is associated with an anti-
competitive economy, which is “heavily dependent on a few low-value added sectors, with poor 
productivity and high sensitivity to small movements in prices and exchange rates and to external 
shocks,” (Burakovsky, et. al., 2006, 3).  Ukraine’s economy can experience severe downturns 
due to shocks in the energy supply, for instance. 
The problem of hidden action may also be relevant.  For instance, while Ukrainian 
leadership may publicly commit to democratization and liberalization, corruption may lead to the 
fixing of elections or insider privatization, and other political actors may be unwilling to carry 
out the steps needed for Europeanization.  Different actors within the Ukraine have different 
motives; there is a national interest in pursuing Europeanization, but undemocratic elites and 
oligarchs desire developmental and financial assistance but not EU laws and regulations 
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(Molchanov, 2004).  Ukrainian elites who desire capitalist development are motivated by the 
incentives of economic development and ties with a strong trading partner (Molchanov, 2004); 
however, their desire for Europeanization has not been matched by reforms (Wolczuk, 2004). 
Ukrainians also hope that associate membership of the EU would guarantee increased financial 
aid (Molchanov, 2004).  Thus, whereas some leaders have declared Europeanization a priority, 
there is neither a strong opposition nor support for Europeanization from society, and the 
volatility of elite actors’ preferences result in a somewhat weak commitment to this goal 
(Wolczuk, 2004).  The elites’ rent-seeking behavior and resistance to sustained reforms also 
weaken the state’s ability to pursue reforms.  As Wolczuk (2004, 11) says: “That pro-European 
declarations have not been accompanied by domestic policy changes can be attributed to the high 
costs of compliance with the EU’s ‘normative targets’ for the Ukrainian ‘parties of power.’” 
Overall, the advantages of Europeanization are economic stability through economic 
reform and integration with one of the world’s strongest economies, the potential for political 
protection by the EU and member states against Russia or others, and prestige.  Pro-Western 
Ukrainians see EU membership as a confirmation of their European self-identification and an 
acknowledgment of Ukraine’s transition to a market economy.  A European affiliation could also 
be a powerful signal to investors or a sign of power to other international actors; EU membership 
would be the best indicator of strength, and unrestricted capital mobility through membership in 
the EU common market would make it easy for European investors to invest in Ukraine. 
Principal-agent theory analyzes the ways in which agents’ aversion to risk affects their 
behavior.  For Ukraine, adopting political and economic reforms is risky—political leaders risk 
alienating elites with a vested interest in the current system, internal opposition to difficult 
economic reforms that have no clear or immediate payoff, and the possibility that reforms will 
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not produce the desired effect and could create a political or economic crisis.  In integrating with 
the West, Ukraine also risks alienating its sizable population of ethnic Russians. 
Finally, implementing reforms is highly costly for Ukraine because of its lack of 
legislative and administrative capacity, as well as interests of elites that prevent against reform 
(Wolczuk, 2004). 
3.2 The ENP as an Institution, through the Principal-Agent Framework 
Because of the capriciousness of Ukraine’s commitment to EU integration, Wolczuk 
(2006) argues that pressure, monitoring, and assistance must come from the EU in order for 
Ukraine to keep up its momentum on reform.  Exacerbating this problem, Kubicek (2007) argues 
that the ENP lacks a clear enforcement mechanism.  Principal-agent theory says that agents must 
be paid more for good outcomes but be penalized with reduced pay for bad outcomes (Ray, 
1998).  Yet the ENP offers only a carrot and no stick to punish; it is unlikely that if reforms fail, 
the EU will cut aid or economic ties with the neighborhood states entirely or punish them with 
sanctions. 
To ensure that Ukraine is undertaking reforms, the ENP incorporates conditionality, as 
the incentives of aid and deepening ties to the EU are conditioned on social and economic 
outcomes (Paul, 2006).  Conditionality in the ENP refers to the incentives scheme, which can be 
revoked, modified, or re-asserted according to how well the EU perceives its neighbors to be 
implementing the Action Plans and adopting the acquis communautaire.  According to the EU 
Commission, “This is a dynamic process—when monitoring demonstrates significant progress in 
attaining the agreed objectives, the EU incentives on offer can be reviewed, or the Action Plans 
adapted, or further proposals made as regards future relations,” (Commission, 2007b, ¶ 5).  
Repeated assertions by EU officials that the EU will only consider Ukrainian accession once 
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Ukraine has achieved democratic stability highlight this notion of conditionality.  The 
conditionality of the ENP Action Plans exists for two reasons.  Political reforms are necessary 
both to make the EU’s aid and economic engagement package effective (in that aid will be more 
useful to a politically stable country) and to meet the EU’s foreign policy objective of promoting 
liberalism and stability abroad. 
If conditionality does not exist in practice, the incentive for fulfillment of the Action Plan 
is decreased.  Hughes, et. al. (2004) describe how conditionality worked during the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement of 2004, in which the EU imposed similar requirements on the Central and Eastern 
European countries to those imposed on Ukraine through the ENP.  They describe conditionality 
as an inconsistent, fluid process.  Various perspectives on EU conditionality exist; some argue 
that EU conditionality is costly to acceding countries because the specific requirements that 
acceding countries must fulfill change according to the political whims of the EU, while others 
argue that conditionality is essential as an EU admission requirement.  In some areas, the acquis 
communautaire is “thick” with detail, while in others the acquis is “thin,” allowing the 
Commission less leverage and weakening conditionality (Hughes, et. al., 2004).  Because the 
Action Plan does not give detailed requirements as to what Ukraine must achieve and because a 
membership perspective is not clear, conditionality imposes costs for Ukraine.  The same was 
true of the accession requirements for the Central and Eastern European countries, which were 
ambivalent (Hughes, et. al., 2004).  Due to these weaknesses, Hughes, et. al. found little evidence 
of direct causal link between EU conditionality and compliance by the Central and Eastern 
European countries.  Furthermore, Zanger (2000) found no strong evidence of good governance 
having an effect on European aid allocation from 1980 to 1995.  The EU has built increasingly 
close relationships with Ukraine over time, beginning with the Agreement on Trade in Textile 
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Products in 1993 and looking toward a new Enhanced Agreement in 2008, despite Ukraine’s 
slow progress toward democracy.  That the EU would stop cooperating with Ukraine in response 
to Ukraine’s failure to fully implement the ENP seems unlikely, and at least some cooperation 
between the EU and Ukraine seems bound to exist.  Thus, elements of conditionality within the 
ENP seem weak, making it unlikely to be effective. 
An analysis of official development assistance to Ukraine from the EU provides evidence 
of how conditionality works in the ENP.  Figure 2 shows official development assistance to the 
Ukraine from all sources.  This figure shows that aid from all sources has been erratic and has 
not increased dramatically since the ENP was instituted.  One would expect that the 
implementation of the ENP would increase flows of aid to Ukraine; however, as ENP builds 
upon existing EU assistance agreements (such as TACIS) rather than introducing new forms of 
aid, aid is not given as a conditional reward.  According to Raik (2006), the EU offers limited 
financial assistance to the neighbors, and little of this goes toward democracy and civil society.  
In fact, the US gave more aid to Ukraine than the EU did from 1998-2004.  This lack of financial 
assistance limits the EU’s ability to promote democracy and weakens conditionality. 
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Figure 2: Official Development Assistance to Ukraine 
from all Sources
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 (Source: Development Data Group, the World Bank) 
 
Total trade with the EU (Figure 3) has increased, but this is somewhat a reflection of 
Ukraine’s increased external trade in general.  Figure 4 shows that trade with the EU as a percent 
of world trade has increased slowly and steadily over the last ten years, without an increase since 
the adoption of the ENP.  While the ENP does not bring market access at once, liberal reforms 
would promote trade between the two.  It may be too early to see the impact of the ENP on trade.  
Adoption of reforms over time may result in improvements in trade relations, if conditionality 
actually holds. 
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Figure 3: Ukraine's Total Trade with EU
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(Source: EuroStat) 
Figure 4: The EU’s Share of Ukraine’s Total World Trade 
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Additionally, the lack of a clear EU membership perspective for Ukraine weakens the 
element of conditionality.  These Action Plans will only be effective in instituting the desired 
economic, political, and social reforms if the neighbor countries are willing to adopt the EU’s 
reform program without prospect of full integration into the EU—that is, if the incentives are 
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sufficiently strong.  As they are not EU members, the neighbor states are asked under the ENP to 
adopt policies that they have no voice in establishing (Kelley, 2006).  Haukkala (2007) argues 
that despite the EU’s asymmetric power over states in its neighborhood, “the key component of 
the Union’s active leverage, political conditionality, has been weak and inefficient,” (p. 12).  
Because the EU is “trying to apply its normative hegemony in Europe along the lines of the 
accession process without the legitimizing effect of enlargement…it is unlikely that the 
economic side of ENP can be robust enough to act as a sufficient incentive for the neighbours,” 
(Haukkala, 2007, p. 14).  Palánkai (2004) argues that conditionality was effective in the 
enlargement process because EU membership was a strong reward, but “for other non-acceding 
countries it is quite problematic,” (348). 
Monitoring mechanisms—a joint assessment and a unilateral EU report—mirror those 
used in the enlargement process.  The EU’s report may have particular significance, as 
international financial institutions will likely use the reports to assess the neighbor countries’ 
financial climate, and the report may affect funding from those financial institutions.  The reports 
can also be used to praise or shame countries, and ENP countries will thus have an incentive to 
compete for praise (Kelley, 2006).  
3.3 Alternatives to ENP: Ukraine’s Reservation Utility 
Adoption of the Action Plan and pursuing membership in the EU are certainly not 
Ukraine’s only options for managing its economy.  Its options are varied: it could close itself off 
from trade entirely (autarky), integrate with Russia and other Central Asian neighbors, or pursue 
membership in the WTO, among other things.  In addition to a discussion of potential integration 
with Eastern European neighbors, we will assess four possible levels of Western integration that 
Ukraine could pursue: low-level integration with the European Union, WTO membership, 
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entrance to the EU common market, and EU membership.  Because WTO membership is the 
next best alternative to EU common market access, pursuing WTO membership represents 
Ukraine’s reservation utility for completing the requirements of the Action Plan.  Each of these 
levels would be achieved in sequence, but Ukraine might not advance to higher levels if it does 
not put forth sufficient effort. 
3.3a Integration with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
 Since the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine has maintained close ties with Russia, owing to 
the countries’ strong historical, cultural, and economic ties.  According to Wolczuk (2004), 
competition between Europeanization and Russification has not led to a clear analysis of which 
path to pursue.  Though the “European choice” has been proclaimed, eastern integration 
continues to remain an option, pulling away from Ukraine’s commitment to Europeanization and 
contributing to the volatility of Ukraine’s reform process.  Seeking to preserve its sphere of 
influence, Russia has sought to continue its economic and political ties with Ukraine.  Ukrainian 
leadership is receptive to cooperation with Russia as it benefits its economy (particularly due to 
its dependence on Russian energy) but has not sought political integration.  While Ukraine’s 
political leadership has resisted re-integration with Russia, elite interests often draw Ukraine 
closer to Russia (Wolczuk, 2004).  
 Prior to the Orange Revolution, in September 2003, Ukraine signed an agreement with 
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to form a Single Economic Space.  They agreed to create a 
common economic area and introduce a single currency within five to seven years (Chaplygin, 
2006).  The SES runs contrary to the goal of European integration, and a country cannot be in 
two customs unions (the SES and EU) at once, so today’s Ukrainian government is therefore not 
prioritizing the Single Economic Space, though Prime Minister Yanukovych is supportive of the 
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SES and says it will help resolve Ukraine’s gas crisis (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe).  Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Oleh Rybachuk said that he 
was “not aware of a single argument that would support the fact that accession to the SES is 
advantageous to Ukraine. If SES documents run counter to European integration, we will not 
implement them, since they do not correspond to our chief course,” (Day Weekly Digest, 2005).  
Trade flows reflect these priorities.  In the past decade, Ukraine’s trade flows have moved away 
from Russia toward other partners, including the EU.  Ukraine wants integration with Russia to 
occur gradually, while Russia seeks rapid integration; this difference in goals “hampers the 
realization of the project,” (Shportyuk and Movchan, 2007). Yet, Ukraine still desires to remove 
trade barriers with Russia, according to Rybachuk.  Integration with former members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States is an alternative that Yushchenko’s government seems to 
be foregoing in favor of Westernization.  It can be seen as the reservation utility of integration 
with Europe. 
Chaplygin, et. al. (2006) analyze the economic implications of a common currency for 
these four countries and find that the economic burden would largely be borne by Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, so creating the currency union would require significant political will 
on their part.  According to Chaplygin, this would have been particularly costly for Ukraine: “It 
would appear that Ukraine could not adopt the rouble without considerable cost to its economic 
performance,” (63).  Shportyuk and Movchan (2007) calculate that deep integration within the 
SES would reduce Ukraine’s GDP by 0.6% and decrease welfare by 0.7%.  The SES is clearly 
not an economically viable path for Ukraine.  “The overview of the macroeconomic 
consequences of Ukraine’s trade regime changes confirms the accuracy of the declared strategy 
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for deeper integration with the EU as the most beneficial option for the economic development 
and welfare,” (Shportyuk and Movchan, 2007, 16). 
Furthermore, economic relations between Ukraine and Russia are volatile.  According to 
Shportyuk and Movchan (2007), some call their relationship a trade war, characterized by 
frequent use of commercial defense measures and other non-tariff barriers.  These problems 
make deep integration with Russia less attractive to Ukraine.  However, the business interests of 
elites in power may lead to closer economic integration with Russia (Wolczuk, 2006).  Closer 
integration with Russia would likely occur only on economic lines and not politically, and 
economic integration with Russia would come second to European integration. 
3.3b Western Integration 
 Instead of pursuing integration in Central Asia, Ukraine under Yushchenko’s leadership 
is pursuing Westernization.  What form this Westernization takes will depend on political will in 
Ukraine as well as how Western institutions reward Ukraine’s efforts.  In our analysis, we 
assume that there are four levels of effort Ukraine could exert, as well as four corresponding 
rewards from Western institutions: a low level of effort (which we will call Ei) will be rewarded 
by low-level cooperation with the European Union (Wi); a high level of effort (Ej) will result in 
WTO membership (Wj); a higher level of effort as demonstrated by fulfillment of the Action 
Plan (Ek) will result in common market membership (Wk), and the highest level of effort (El) 
could result in European Union membership (Wl).  In our analysis, Ei < Ej and Wi< Wj for i<j. 
We analyze each of these levels of effort and reward, including the costs and benefits for 
Ukraine as well as the risks to the EU in offering these rewards or “wages.”  These levels are 
summarized in the payoff matrix (Table 1). 
3.3c Low-level Cooperation with the European Union 
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 The EU and Ukraine have worked together cooperatively for over a decade.  The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1994, will expire in 2008.  Currently, the EU 
and Ukraine are negotiating an Enhanced Agreement to take its place.  The strength of the 
agreement will depend on the parties’ political will; low effort by Ukraine will be met by a low 
level of commitment and prospects of minimal cooperation with the EU.  In order to maintain a 
working relationship with the EU, Ukraine need not undertake drastic reforms.  Even if Ukraine 
does not pursue reforms, its presence as a global trade actor and its shared border with the EU 
necessitate that the two actors will interact at some minimal level.  Unless Ukraine should cut 
itself off from global trade or align itself with Russia in some Cold War II scenario, Ukraine and 
the EU will likely cooperate, at least at a low level.  Ukraine’s cooperative efforts will be thus 
rewarded by cooperative efforts from the EU.  Thus, a benefit of this type of relationship is that it 
is low-cost for Ukraine.  Ukraine could continue to receive aid from the EU and its member 
states and continue to collaborate with the EU on political and economic goals at its will.  For 
example, in 1993, Ukraine and the European Communities signed an Agreement on Trade in 
Textile Products.  Ukraine might also benefit from European technical assistance, and Ukraine 
would likely receive humanitarian and development aid; Ukraine certainly received aid from the 
EU and member states before the Orange Revolution when its Western orientation was 
established, suggesting that pro-European reforms are not required for aid.  This cooperation 
could occur even if Ukraine joins a free trade area with Central Asian states. 
 From the perspective of the EU, this relationship is not desirable because it keeps 
Ukraine at a distance and allows the possibility that Ukraine pursue closer ties with Russia.  The 
EU’s goal is to see Ukraine democratize, but cooperative agreements are loose and do not 
provide a strong framework or incentives for political and economic reform.  Such a relationship 
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could potentially entail losses for the EU; while Ukraine could expend minimal effort and gain 
some benefits, the EU would make an investment through financial aid, technical assistance, and 
diplomatic consultations which would have almost no payoff in creating a stronger, more stable 
Ukraine. 
3.3d World Trade Organization Membership 
World Trade Organization membership would benefit Ukraine’s economy greatly and is 
a goal that Ukrainian leadership declares the country to be working toward.  As a member of the 
WTO, Ukraine would have Most Favored Nation status, abolishing quantitative restrictions with 
its trading partners, including the EU.  According to Ukrainian state secretary of the Ministry of 
Economy and European Integration Andriy Honcharuk (2004), this would have several key 
effects on Ukraine’s economy.  Through a reduction in tariffs, Ukraine would have more 
liberalized access to world markets, trading with the WTO’s 151 members, and consumers 
would benefit from price reductions.  According to Honcharuk, currently up to $2 billion in 
markets are closed to Ukrainian products, and these markets would be opened with WTO 
accession.  Increased exports would also increase Ukraine’s stock of foreign currency.  The 
WTO also has agreements on import and export procedures, and compliance with these rules 
would facilitate transit of goods.  WTO membership would eliminate non-tariff barriers, such as 
technical requirements and certification standards.  In trade disputes, WTO membership would 
improve Ukraine’s ability to defend its interests and protect producers through the dispute 
settlement mechanism (Kinakh, 2007).  According to Honcharuk (2004), up to $750 million 
worth of Ukrainian exports are at risk of investigation or antidumping restrictive measures; an 
improved ability to negotiate through the WTO could thus have a sizable economic impact.  In 
particular, ferrous metals are subject to antidumping and special inquiries, but removal of these 
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barriers would lead to an increase in exports.  Honcharuk estimates that Ukraine’s 2001 ferrous 
metal exports of $463.8 million could have been $553.8 million if ferrous metals were not 
subject to quotas, and $643.8 million if Ukraine was a member of the WTO.  Ferrous metals and 
light industry will benefit from elimination of EU quotas as well (Eremenko, et. al, 2004).  
Finally, as a member of the WTO, Ukraine could have a voice in WTO negotiations, asserting its 
own economic interests.  Ukraine would also be able to participate in negotiations on EU 
agricultural subsidies (World Bank, 2005). 
Pavel, et. al. (2004) analyze the impact of WTO accession on Ukraine’s economy.  They 
find that WTO membership would increase Ukraine’s consumer welfare by 3.0% and GDP by 
1.9%.  Aggregate exports would increase by 128.5 billion UAH (Ukranian grivna) and aggregate 
imports would increase by 125.2 billion UAH.  Total exports would increase by 13.5% and total 
imports by 13.1%.  According to Burakovsky (2004), Ukraine’s metallurgical, textile, and 
clothing industries will export more to the EU.  An additional important benefit is that the 
reforms mandated by the WTO would create a stable legislative environment, encouraging 
investment as well as securing Ukraine’s market economy by dismantling the existing 
bureaucracy.  Benefits would accrue through tariff reduction, greater market access, and 
adjustments to domestic taxation. 
Just as adopting the EU acquis would help liberalize Ukraine’s economy and improve its 
competitiveness, adopting the WTO accession standards could help develop Ukraine’s economy, 
resulting in a decrease in transactions costs.  Adoption of WTO standards would create greater 
stability and predictability in the country, as well as guaranteeing channels of exports between 
Ukraine and all other WTO member states (EU Commission, 2007a).  
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An additional benefit of WTO accession to Ukraine is that it is seen as a step toward EU 
membership.  Rather than fulfilling the Action Plan, which has no guarantee of an EU 
membership perspective in the future nor even a concrete promise of market access, WTO 
membership is more tangible.  If neither WTO membership nor implementation of the Action 
Plan will lead to an EU accession agreement, it may make more sense for Ukraine to pursue 
WTO membership instead of the ENP.  Thus, pursuit of WTO membership is an objective that 
risk-averse Ukraine might pursue instead of fulfillment of the Action Plan or EU membership.  
WTO membership would not likely alienate Russia (which has also pursued WTO membership) 
nor Ukraine’s Russian population. 
For Ukraine, costs of pursuing membership in the WTO are high, particularly because 
Ukraine’s economy was inherited from the USSR and is incompatible with the economies of 
Western states that designed the WTO (Schuler, 2004).  Ukraine must adopt difficult economic 
reforms in order to be considered for membership.  Compliance with WTO rules will require the 
introduction of legislation and rules, such as changing regulatory policy in trade, and this is a 
slow and difficult process (Burakovsky, 2004).  Ukraine will need to liberalize access to its 
market by foreign companies and to develop institutional capacities to make sure Ukraine abides 
by the WTO’s principles of transparency, rule of law, effective enforcement of contractual 
discipline, and an independent judiciary system.  For instance, Ukraine must create institutions to 
maintain its transparency, reporting all trade policies to the WTO so that information on 
Ukraine’s policies can be disseminated to all member states.  These changes will impose 
diplomatic costs on Ukraine, which must raise the professional qualifications of its negotiators, 
maintain a staff to deal with the adjustment to these new institutions, engage in bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, and negotiate with interested parties domestically (Burakovsky, 2004; 
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Deutsch, 2004).  Still, the cost is less than pursuit of EU membership or fulfillment of the ENP, 
as political reforms are not required and WTO regulations are less extensive than the acquis.  
Pursuit of WTO membership is risky in that economic reforms might fail or meet resistance from 
those elites whose power would be threatened by free trade.  Lower import tariffs will increase 
competition from imports of textiles, metallurgy products, and electric machines (Honcharuk, 
2004).  In the long run, the economy will benefit from this increased competition, but there will 
be short run costs as producers will need to increase their competitiveness and adapt to new 
regulations.  Assisting workers with the transition to the new economy, such as by providing 
training courses, will also impose costs on Ukraine (Burakovsky, 2004).  
Schuler (2004) describes many of the capacity-building projects that Ukraine would need 
to complete in order to become a member of the WTO.  In the realm of international property 
rights, Ukraine would need to rewrite its laws in order to ensure compliance as well as build 
well-functioning capital markets and create contract enforcement capabilities in order to attract 
investors.  Ukraine also needs to alter its industrial product standards, and over 2,500 regulations 
need to be harmonized with WTO rules; it must create a certification system for high-technology 
goods and harmonize its laws with international standards.  These changes would require 
administrative reorganization, capacity building, and public education.  Schuler estimates that 
Ukraine would need to spend at least $40 million over four to five years to complete these 
reforms, and it would cost over $100 million for building metrology facilities which provide 
measurement information.  Finally, food, plant, and animal safety regulations would cost an 
estimated $40 million to harmonize and to establish transparency procedures. 
The EU would not be required to assist Ukraine in its pursuit of WTO membership, 
though it likely will support Ukraine in this goal through financial aid and other support.  The 
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EU would benefit from Ukrainian accession to the WTO because it would be able to trade with 
Ukraine on a most-favored nation basis.  Additionally, WTO membership would bring economic 
stability to Ukraine, potentially preventing economic crises that the EU would need to intervene 
in.  Ukrainian economic development through WTO membership would also reduce the need for 
EU aid and assistance.  Economic gains for the EU would likely be close to its gains from EU 
accession.  However, the EU would make fewer political gains.  WTO membership would not 
ally Ukraine with the EU nor preclude Ukrainian political allegiance with Russia.  The risk for 
the EU is that Ukraine might still ally with Russia. 
3.3e Common Market Membership 
 The ENP offers the prospect of EU common market membership.  Because it would 
require a sustained commitment to political and economic reforms through the framework 
specified in the Action Plan, it is highly costly for Ukraine in terms of effort.  It is also risky for 
Ukraine to pursue because whether Ukraine could actually become a member of the common 
market is not entirely clear, given that this may encounter resistance from the EU, and what will 
constitute full implementation of the Action Plan is not well-defined.  The ENP’s design also 
gives asymmetric power to the EU because the EU writes the acquis that Ukraine must adopt.  
According to Raik (2006), the asymmetric interdependence that is entailed in the ENP restricts 
Ukraine’s self-determination and could foster resentment toward the EU.  While states that adopt 
the acquis as part of the accession progress will someday become part of the EU’s decision-
making process and thus will not always face a power asymmetry, as a state without a 
membership perspective, Ukraine does not have a prospect of lessening this power asymmetry.  
Pursuing the ENP could therefore have political costs or could be seen as an impediment to 
Ukrainian sovereignty. 
  Bruce 31 
Through its incentives scheme, the ENP provides a lengthy list of incentives for neighbor 
states (the “agents,” following the principal-agent theory model) to pursue the Action Plans.  
This “incentive constraint” offered in the Action Plans includes: economic integration and a 
stake in the EU’s Internal Market; increased political cooperation; reduction of barriers to trade; 
increased financial support; participation in programs promoting cultural, educational, 
environmental, technical and scientific linkages; support in meeting EU standards, and 
deepening economic relations.  A European Neighborhood Instrument coordinates technical 
assistance and promotes trade infrastructures, financing reforms (Milcher & Slay, 2005).  The 
EU also provides billions of dollars in aid to the neighborhood countries, through various pre-
existing programs (such as TACIS) that provide some of the framework for the ENP 
(Commission, 2007c).   
Trusting that the Action Plan will bring the benefits of the EU common market as 
promised is risky as well.  For one thing, it is uncertain exactly how much integration the 
neighbors can expect to gain in pursuit of the ENP.  Haukkala argues that vested interests within 
the EU would oppose opening the EU internal market to those states’ most crucial exports, such 
as steel and agricultural products from Ukraine.  Akgül Açikmeşe (2005) also argues that some 
of the ENP’s promises are unrealistic, such as free movement of people, which EU member 
states will oppose.  Indeed, people and services still cannot flow freely between the EU and its 
newest member states.  That Ukraine shares a border with Russia makes its integration with the 
EU particularly contentious (Miller, 2002).  Some might oppose free movement of people 
between the EU and Ukraine because Russians could easily enter the EU through Ukraine, 
potentially leading to a surge in illegal Russian immigration in the EU.  The spectre of 
competition from migrant Ukrainians for European jobs might also foster opposition.  Akgül 
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Açikmeşe (2005) also questioned whether the EU will continue to allocate sufficient funds to the 
ENP to make its fulfillment realistic.  Schneider (2007) found that opposition by EU member 
states to distributive outcomes of enlargement have led to the EU restricting membership 
benefits for EU member states; therefore, the risk that Ukraine will not receive all the promised 
benefits of membership is certainly plausible.  Despite the EU’s continued stance that Ukraine 
must demonstrate a commitment to democratization and action before it will consider Ukrainian 
membership, the EU has not explicitly stated what exactly will be considered “sufficient action” 
(Kuzio, 2006).  As fulfillment of the ENP is not explicitly stated as a point on the path to EU 
membership, from Ukraine’s pro-membership perspective, there is no reason to fulfill the Action 
Plan’s requirements.  As Wolczuk (2006) says, “the lack of a clear-cut project makes 
Evrointegratsia a project too abstract to ‘focus the minds’ of many politicians in Ukraine,” (p. 8). 
These risks make adoption of the Action Plan a gamble—the precise payoff is unclear.  
Because Ukraine is a risk-averse actor, the uncertainty inherent in the Action Plan adds an 
additional cost to implementation of the Action Plan, reducing Ukraine’s incentives to reform.  
This risk aversion may explain some of the volatility in Ukraine’s attitude toward 
Europeanization; perhaps Ukraine is not willing to devote itself fully to EU membership because 
of the risk entailed in doing so.  Still, Ukraine sees the ENP as a step toward attaining a new 
agreement with a clear EU membership perspective. 
For the EU, offering common market membership is less risky than offering an EU 
membership perspective.  The EU can avoid the costs that enlargement entails while gaining a 
close relationship with the Ukraine that will solidify Ukraine’s Western orientation.  Because 
Ukraine would not become a member of EU institutions, there are no risks to the EU’s 
institutions.  The EU holds asymmetric power; it already has the acquis written, and the acquis 
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benefit its own interests.  The EU merely needs to ensure that Ukraine adopt political and 
economic reforms and so endures some costs through financial aid, technical support, and 
diplomatic work. 
 Offering Ukrainian access to the EU common market, however, is a high risk for the EU.  
Ukraine shares a long border with Russia, and if it becomes a member of the EU common 
market, it will have free movement of people.  Thus, Russians could illegally access the EU 
through Ukraine; just as Europeans feared that enlargement to Central and Eastern European 
countries would result in a surge of cheap labor from the new member states, Ukrainian common 
market membership could arouse a fear of cheap Ukranian labor or illegal Russian labor.  The 
EU also risks competition from some Ukrainian sectors, such as steel, that might damage its own 
industries.  Potentially, the EU could impose protectionist restrictions to avert these risks, 
making political resistance from EU members an additional risk that Ukraine faces. 
 One way to assess the potential impact of Ukrainian access to the EU common market is 
to analyze other states that have access to the EU common market but are not EU members.  
Through the European Economic Area, Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway have access to the 
common market, including free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital.  However, a 
shortcoming of the EEA is that agriculture and fishing products have restricted movement 
(Pointner, 2005).  Sweden, Finland, and Austria were members of the EEA before joining the 
EU, suggesting that common market membership could be a precursor to EU membership.  
Membership in the common market and the EEA increased Finland’s growth by 0.7 %, Austria’s 
growth by 0.4 %, and Sweden’s growth by 0.3 % (Breuss, 2005 as cited in Pointner, 2005).  The 
EEA member states benefit from access to the EU common market, and as wealthy nations, they 
avoid having to contribute to EU funds as they would as EU members (Hindley and Howe, 
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2001).  Ukraine, a poorer nation, would likely be a net recipient of EU funds as a member; 
common market membership would be less advantageous for Ukraine in this respect.  
Membership in the common market does not allow EEA states to contribute to the EU’s 
decision-making process so they cannot promote their economic interests through EU decisions, 
though they are affected by EU decisions and must adopt some of the EU’s rules.  Still, EEA 
members are consulted on future EU single-market directives, though they do not have a formal 
vote.  Therefore, while they are granted some voice, their exclusion from EU institutions gives 
them less power over their economy.  According to Hindley and Howe (2001), the list of single-
market harmonization measures that EEA states had to implement is hundreds of pages long, 
while the actual measures are thousands of pages.  This suggests that becoming a member of the 
common market is a laborious, costly process.  Finally, EEA member states are precluded from 
deeper integration, such as joining the monetary union and political integration.  
 Another possibility would be for Ukraine to sign a Free Trade Agreement with the EU 
and thereby gain most of the advantages of common market membership, though benefits would 
be limited to the specific sectors covered by the agreement.  Switzerland, for instance, has had a 
FTA with the EU since 1972.  Still, Van Nieuwkoop and Müller (2001) found that Switzerland 
would benefit from becoming a member of the EU; a FTA does not confer all the economic 
benefits that EU membership does on member states.  Additional benefits accrue through the 
small increase in access to the EU market and monetary union membership.  EU membership 
would have negative economic impacts on Switzerland due to an increase in taxes and transfers 
to the EU (Van Nieuwkoop and Müller, 2001).  Ukraine might benefit from EU membership in 
these areas where Switzerland would lose.  EU Free Trade Agreements frequently exclude 
agriculture and some heavy industry, sectors which would be important for Ukraine to liberalize.  
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Thus, a Free Trade Agreement with the EU would be of limited value to Ukraine, though would 
lead to increased trade and would stimulate investment and Ukraine’s economic modernization 
(Burakovsky, et. al., 2006).  Thus, it seems that an FTA would be less advantageous to Ukraine 
than EU membership.  Shportyuk and Movchan (2007) calculated the benefits of Ukraine 
establishing an FTA with the EU after acceding to the WTO.  They found that the FTA would 
increase real GDP by 3.1% and welfare by 8.1%.  
 Benefits of the common market include a common external tariff, elimination of border 
costs and delays, and reduced costs of complying with national standards, as these standards are 
subsumed by common market standards (Cohen, 2007).  Joining the EU common market would 
have positive trade effects, as final product costs would be reduced by five to ten percent (Cohen, 
2007).  Due to increased competition within the common market, Ukrainian businesses would 
adapt and become more efficient, and increased specialization through the international division 
of labor would result in more growth (Pointner, 2005).  Adopting the Action Plan reforms would 
also create a more favorable investment climate, attracting investment and reducing capital 
flight, while reducing negative consequences that could result from simply eliminating trade 
barriers between the EU and Ukraine (EU Commission, 2007a).  Common market membership, 
defined by a new treaty between the EU and Ukraine, would reduce the risk of investing in 
Ukraine, encouraging investment, and the Action Plan’s reforms will improve Ukraine’s 
business climate (Burakovsky, et. al., 2006).  Pointner (2005) found that EEA members 
experienced lower inflation due to the elimination of customs costs and increased 
competitiveness that prevented monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior.  Inflation decreased 
especially in industrial goods, where competition is greater compared to the services sector.  
These benefits would likely accrue to Ukraine as a member of the common market as well.  
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Because all EU common market members abide by the same regulatory standards, 
manufacturing would be less burdened by regulations, and consumers would benefit from 
product standardization (Cohen, 2007).  Adopting the acquis is important for this purpose.  In a 
study of how institutions impact bilateral trade, De Groot, et. al. (2004, as cited in Lejour and 
Mooij, 2005) showed that a regulatory framework such as that of the EU could increase bilateral 
trade between 12 and 18 percent, while better quality institutions and a reduction in corruption 
could increase trade by 17 to 27 percent.  Adoption of the acquis could therefore have a 
tremendous impact on EU-Ukraine trade.  Cohen’s (2007) analysis of literature on common 
market membership shows that other Eastern European countries experienced welfare gains 
between 3.4 and 18.8 percent of GDP. 
 Free movement of persons would likely result in emigration from Ukraine to the EU, 
imposing costs for both actors.  De Mooij and Tang (2003) estimated that for Central and Eastern 
European Countries (not including Ukraine), EU accession would result in a net migration of 3 
percent of the population.  In the long run, this migration could be expected to contribute to 
increased international specialization, though it would impose short run costs. 
3.3f European Union Membership 
 Although the EU has thus far been unwilling to offer Ukraine a membership perspective, 
in our analysis we presume that Ukraine could become a member of the European Union with a 
very high amount of effort. 
 The benefits of EU membership are difficult to quantify, though researchers attempt to 
estimate the benefits of growth by assessing proxies for integration, such as trade, foreign direct 
investment, and research and development expenditure.  According to Katan and Yigit (2007), 
accession to the EU raises living standards by increasing political, economic, and institutional 
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cooperation and knowledge sharing.  In their study of the benefits of EU accession, Katan and 
Yigit (2007) found that integration into the EU resulted in capital accumulation and technology 
transfer, increasing the country’s growth.  Some of these benefits would certainly accrue to 
Ukraine as a member of the common market, though institutional membership would bring 
greater cooperation, potentially resulting in further improved growth.  In a study of the Central 
and Eastern European member states, De Mooij and Tang (2003) estimated that EU accession 
would result in long term GDP increases from 1.5 to 7.8 percent.  Although Ukraine was not 
included in these estimates, it shares similarities with these countries in its level of welfare and in 
the economic and bureaucratic structures inherited from the USSR.  Though estimates of the 
effect of EU membership on Ukraine’s GDP were not available, De Mooij and Tang’s results 
suggest that the impact would be significant. 
Membership in the EU confers many benefits beyond what is offered in common market 
membership alone.  Benefits include agricultural subsidies through the Common Agricultural 
Policy and other transfers from the EU budget (Grether and Müller, 2001), as Ukraine would be 
a net recipient of the EU budget.  During the accession process and until its economy became 
significantly strong, Ukraine would receive Structural Adjustment Funds from the EU; as a low-
income member state, Ukraine would be a net recipient of internal Cohesion Funds.  Cohesion 
Funds are provided to member states whose GDP is below 90% of the EU average; for 2004-
2006, € 15.9 billion was allocated, with € 8.49 billion going to new member states (EU 
Commission, 2006).  Kutan and Yigit (2007) found that Structural Adjustment and Cohesion 
Funds are extremely important in furthering economic growth and raising productivity for 
countries acceding to the EU.  These funds allow for long run growth and convergence, 
offsetting initial distortions in prices of productive factors that occurs during accession and that 
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would occur through common market membership alone.  EU membership would also increase 
Ukraine’s access to credit, investment, and technology, which would help increase Ukraine’s 
economic growth (Wolczuk, 2004).  Ukraine would also benefit by becoming a member of EU 
institutions; it would be able to help set policies rather than simply having to implement those 
that would be required of it as a member of the common market.  These benefits that accrue 
through EU membership would enable Ukraine to take full advantage of common market 
membership, whereas market access alone brings fewer benefits because Ukraine has a weak 
economy currently (Wolczuk, 2004). 
Economic gains to the EU from offering EU membership would be realized through 
common market membership.  EU member states that are net contributors would lose from 
subsidies and other transfers made to Ukraine.  
 More difficult to quantify is the benefit in terms of reputation that would accrue to the 
Ukraine as a member of the EU.  Palánkai (2004) found that association agreements (cooperative 
agreements with the EU) improved countries’ reputation in international organizations and 
among investors.  Thus while Ukraine surely gains a benefit in reputation by association with the 
EU through the ENP, this benefit would surely magnify if Ukraine were an EU member. 
 It is unclear how much effort Ukraine would have to put in, beyond the effort required to 
fulfill the Action Plan, in order to become an EU member.  If the EU was more eager to enlarge, 
fulfillment of the Action Plan might result in EU membership, given the similarities between the 
Action Plans and earlier accession agreements.  Therefore at this point, Ukraine’s required effort 
in order to achieve EU membership is unclear, though it is greater to or equal than E3.  The risk 
to Ukraine in putting forth this effort is that a membership perspective might never materialize.  
Ukrainian membership in the EU could also damage its relations with Russia. 
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 Ukrainian membership in the EU would entail the risks of common market membership 
as well as additional risks to the EU.  The chief risk is that enlargement would strain the EU by 
draining the political will of member states, fostering anti-Europeanization among EU citizens, 
further slowing and complicating the EU institutions, and jeopardizing deeper integration within 
the EU.  At a time when many Europeans are pessimistic about the EU, and given the EU’s 
stalemate over the constitution issue, deepening seems more important to the EU than widening.  
Some EU member states face more financial risk than others due to enlargement, as those states 
which are net contributors to the EU budget may be burdened by Ukraine, and other states may 
receive a smaller portion of the EU budget if it must be shared with Ukraine.  For instance, in 
analyzing the costs of the EU’s 2004 Eastern enlargement, Hughes, et. al. (2004) argue that 
Spain and Portugal would lose in terms of diverted Structural Adjustment and Cohesion Funds, 
while they would benefit little from increased trade due to their geographic distance from the 
new member states.  European enlargement has also been interpreted by Russia as a threat, and 
enlarging to Ukraine would undoubtedly be deemed threatening by Putin’s regime.  In enlarging, 
the EU therefore risks aggravating Russia.  However, the EU can shift risks to Ukraine by 
practicing “discriminatory membership,” offering only restricted membership benefits; for 
instance, during the 2004 Eastern enlargement, the EU agreed to only offer full agricultural 
subsidies to the acceding member states after ten years (Schneider, 2007).  Finally, EU 
membership is far more permanent than common market membership, so offering an irreversible 
membership perspective is risky for the EU. 
 For the EU, Ukrainian membership would allow the EU to play a stronger role in 
Ukraine.  Ukraine is important for the EU’s energy security; thus, political influence in Ukraine 
would strengthen the EU’s security.  Since almost 90% of EU natural gas imports from Russia 
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pass through Ukraine, Ukrainian membership in the EU would give the EU direct access to the 
pipelines, reducing risk.  Ukrainian membership in the EU would give the EU more strategic 
control over the Black Sea area and would pre-empt Russian political control of Ukraine.  EU 
membership would also give the EU access to Ukrainian land, for agricultural or solar energy 
projects that might benefit all member states (European Policy Centre, 2007). 
Table 1: Payoff matrix for various types of Westernization 
Low-level Cooperation 
 Examples: sector-specific trade agreements, technical assistance projects, consultative or 
“collaborative” partnership agreements 
Costs for Ukraine 
 Low cost: weak (if any) commitment to 
political and economic reform, and pro-
European reforms are not required for 
aid 
Costs for EU 
 Likely exceed benefits 
 Expenditure on financial aid, technical 
assistance, diplomatic consultations 
 
Benefits for Ukraine 
 Humanitarian and development aid 
from EU and member states 
 Collaboration on specific projects as 
desired: development, democracy, 
cultural exchanges, etc. 
 Technical assistance to pursue these 
projects 
Benefits for EU 
 Collaboration on goals as desired could 
produce sector-specific trade benefits 
Risks for Ukraine 
 Might come short of having strong 
impact on economy, so effort could be 
wasted 
 Might not lead to EU membership 
perspective 
Risks for EU 
 Agreements on paper might not lead to 
tangible reforms because dependent on 
Ukrainian political will 
 Ukraine might develop closer ties with 
Russia 
 Ukraine will not become stronger or 
more stable 
 
WTO Membership 
 
Costs for Ukraine 
 Adoption of difficult economic reforms 
(but not political reforms): opening 
trade, removing protectionism 
 Introduction of legislation and rules 
 Development of institutional 
capabilities 
Costs for EU 
 Financial assistance for Ukraine in 
pursuit of this goal through aid and 
assistance 
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 Raise skills of negotiators 
 Maintain staff to deal with adjustment 
to new institutions 
 Bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
 Negotiation with interested parties 
domestically 
 Short run costs for producers who adapt 
to new regulations and competition 
 Helping workers adjust to transition 
 Over $40 million required to change 
industrial product standards (Schuler) 
 Over $100 million for building 
metrology facilities (Schuler) 
 $40 million to harmonize food, plant, 
animal safety regulations (Schuler) 
Benefits for Ukraine 
 Most Favored Nation status 
 Abolition of quantitative restrictions 
with trade partners 
 Price reductions for consumers 
 Opening of $2 billion worth of markets 
for Ukrainian products (Honcharuk) 
 Facilitation of transit of goods 
 Improved ability to defend interests and 
protect producers through dispute 
settlement mechanism 
 Consumer welfare increase of 3.0% 
(Pavel) 
 GDP increase of 1.9% (Pavel) 
 Increased exports by 128.5 billion 
UAH (especially ferrous metals, light 
industry, textiles, clothing) and imports 
by 125.2 billion UAH (Pavel) 
 Increase in stock of foreign currency 
 Tariff reduction, elimination of non-
tariff barriers, more liberalized access 
to world markets 
 Improvements in competitiveness 
 Investment encouraged by more stable 
legislative environment 
 Lower transaction costs due to reforms 
 Possible step toward EU membership 
 Participation in WTO negotiations, 
including on EU agricultural subsidies 
Benefits for EU 
 Able to trade with Ukraine on most-
favored nation basis 
 Ukrainian economic stability 
 Reduced reliance on EU aid 
Risks for Ukraine 
 Reforms might fail or meet resistance 
Risks for EU 
 Ukraine could still ally with Russia 
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 Domestic political risk: resistance from 
protected industries and elites 
(especially in textiles, metallurgy 
products, and electric machines) 
 
EU Common Market Membership 
 Fulfillment of the ENP Action Plan 
Costs for Ukraine 
 Highly costly: sustained commitment to 
political and economic reforms as 
enumerated in Action Plan 
 Adoption of EU rules without a voice 
in establishing them due to asymmetric 
power relationship 
 Implementing 80,000 pages of acquis 
 Emigration from Ukraine to EU 
 Distortions in prices of productive 
factors 
Costs for EU 
 Costs of ensuring Ukrainian reform: 
financial aid, technical support, 
diplomacy 
 Immigration from Ukraine to EU 
Benefits for Ukraine 
 Economic growth  
 Increased trade 
 Free movement of goods, services, 
persons, and capital through EU 
 Increased political cooperation 
 Reduction of non-tariff barriers 
 Increased financial support 
 Participation in cultural, educational, 
environmental, technical, scientific 
programs 
 Deeper economic relations with EU 
 New product markets, access to cheaper 
products, immigration, FDI 
 European Neighborhood Instrument 
provides financial support 
 Sector-specific benefits 
 Stimulus to investment and economic 
modernization 
 Common external tariff 
 Elimination of border costs and delays 
 Reduced costs of complying with 
national standards 
 Final product costs decline by 5-10% 
(Cohen) 
 Increased competition would improve 
business efficiency 
 Increased specialization 
Benefits for EU 
 Free movement of goods, services, 
persons, and capital through EU 
 Access to Ukrainian markets 
 Investment opportunities in Ukraine 
 Reduction of non-tariff barriers 
 Solidify Ukraine’s Western orientation 
 Opportunity to influence Ukraine’s 
political and economic system through 
acquis 
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 Improved business climate 
 Lower inflation 
 Reduced corruption 
Risks for Ukraine 
 Political resistance from EU member 
states 
 All benefits might not materialize 
(especially immigration, products such 
as agriculture and steel) 
 Not entirely clear how EU will decide 
when Action Plan is “completed” 
 Political resistance within Ukraine due 
to lack of self-determination 
 Could foster resentment toward EU 
Risks for EU 
 Influx of Russian and Ukrainian 
immigrants 
 Competition from Ukrainian industry, 
agriculture, and labor 
 
EU Membership 
 
Costs for Ukraine 
 Costs of Ukrainian common market 
membership 
 Additional costs could occur, 
depending on what criteria EU sets for 
membership 
Costs for EU 
 Costs of Ukrainian common market 
membership 
 Transfers to Ukraine (especially costly 
for wealthier member states): structural 
adjustment funds, cohesion funds, 
agricultural subsidies (CAP) 
Benefits for Ukraine 
 Increased political, economic, and 
institutional cooperation and 
knowledge sharing with EU members 
 Capital accumulation and technology 
transfer 
 Long term growth 
 Net beneficiary of EU budget: 
Structural Adjustment Funds, Cohesion 
Funds, agricultural subsidies (CAP) 
 Funding will promote more long-term 
growth than possible through market 
access alone, offsetting distortions in 
prices of productive factors 
 Economic growth, convergence with 
EU member states 
 Improved access to credits, 
investments, technologies 
 Some ability to influence EU policies 
so as to be more favorable to Ukrainian 
economic interests 
 Improved reputation in international 
Benefits for EU 
 Benefits of Ukrainian membership in 
common market 
 Solidify Ukraine’s Western orientation 
 Opportunity for political influence 
 Strategic control over Black Sea area 
 Pre-empt Russian political control of 
Ukraine 
 Access to Ukrainian land 
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organizations and among investors 
Risks for Ukraine 
 Membership perspective may never 
materialize 
 Might aggravate Russia 
Risks for EU 
 Straining EU and member states 
(Eurosclerosis) 
 Might aggravate Russia 
 Ukraine borders Russia: influx of 
illegal immigrants possible 
 Competition from Ukrainian sectors 
 Membership is irreversible 
 
3.4 Assessment of ENP’s Results in the Ukraine 
Given the weaknesses of the ENP and the availability of alternatives for Ukraine, how 
effective has the ENP been in effecting political and economic change in Ukraine?  Despite 
Ukraine’s strongly professed desire for EU membership, it is lagging behind in implementing 
necessary reforms.  Since the Orange Revolution and the adoption of the ENP, Ukraine’s 
economic growth has slowed dramatically, and public confidence in democratic reform has 
declined.  Yanukovych’s election in 2004 prompted the addition of a ten-point “Road Map” to its 
Action Plan, but this changed little and was not seen as an opening of the EU’s doors to the 
possibility of Ukrainian membership in the EU (Kuzio, 2006).  Indeed, in November 2006, the 
EU issued a report denying Ukrainian accession, saying Ukraine had not made significant 
economic and judicial reforms (Kubicek, 2007).  Furthermore, the EU has focused on human 
rights and freedom of the media as areas needing reform (Molchanov, 2004).  In advance of the 
September 30, 2007 elections, EU and Ukrainian leaders agreed in a joint statement that “free 
and fair early parliamentary elections…and the formation of an effective and stable government” 
would be steps toward deeper integration with the EU (Runner, 2007, ¶ 1). 
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show measurements of Ukraine’s political climate.  The Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Figure 5) rates countries from zero to ten, with a score of ten indicating no 
corruption.  Ukraine’s corruption index has not changed significantly between 1998 and 2007, 
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suggesting that political reforms to reduce corruption are not taking place.  The Political Terror 
Scale (Figure 6) uses reports from Amnesty International (“Amnesty”) and the U.S. Department 
of State (“State”) to assess “political terror,” with a score of five indicating high terror and a 
score of one indicating low terror.  This shows a slight increase in political terror in Ukraine 
since 1992, but overall, the level of political terror has stayed mostly between two and three.  
Again, this suggests that political reforms that promote democratization and human rights are not 
taking place in Ukraine.  The Freedom in the World indicators (Figure 7) show scores for both 
political rights and civil liberties.  Freedom House rates countries in these two areas, with a score 
of 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and a score of 7 indicating the lowest degree of 
freedom.  These ratings have improved over time, with improvements in civil liberties since 
2004 and in political rights since 2005.  In all years prior to 2005, Ukraine was rated as “Partly 
Free” but was rated “Free” in 2005 and 2006.  Contrary to the Political Terror Scale and 
Corruption Perceptions Index, on these measures, Ukraine’s political climate is improving 
somewhat. 
These contradictions could reflect the rating agencies’ differing methodologies or could 
indicate that Ukraine’s political reforms are occurring in particular ways; the entire political 
regime as a whole is changing very slowly, though specific areas such as political freedoms are 
improving.  Still, according to Freedom House, Ukraine is not close to achieving judicial 
standards set by the EU (Freedom House).  One must interpret these results with caution, as the 
ENP was only adopted in 2004; perhaps with more time, political reform will take place.  
Whether future reforms will be stimulated by the ENP cannot be determined easily; however, it 
is clear from these initial findings that adoption of the ENP has not had any dramatic, immediate 
  Bruce 46 
effect on Ukraine’s political climate, and that Ukraine’s political climate has been relatively 
stagnant since the early 1990s, despite cooperative agreements with the EU. 
Figure 5: Corruption Perceptions Index for Ukraine
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(Source: Transparency International) 
 
Figure 6: Political Terror Scale ratings for Ukraine
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Figure 7: Freedom in the World Ratings for Ukraine 
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 (Source: Freedom House) 
 
Measures of Ukraine’s economic performance seem to show that it is improving overall, 
with real GDP growth (Figure 8) on an upward trend, the inflation rate (Figure 9) stabilizing, and 
unemployment (Figure 10) declining.  These data are only available through 2005, so again, one 
cannot disambiguate the effect of the ENP from other causes of economic improvement.  
However, these figures demonstrate that Ukraine’s economy was experiencing economic 
improvement prior to the adoption of the ENP Action Plan in 2004.  It is somewhat surprising 
that Ukraine’s economy has improved while its political climate has not improved; EU rhetoric 
suggests that both must improve as the Action Plan is implemented and that reforms in both 
areas are required before the EU will consider a Ukrainian accession. 
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Figure 8: Real GDP Growth Rate in Ukraine 
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(Source: EuroStat) 
Figure 9: Inflation Rate in Ukraine 
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Figure 10: Unemployment in Ukraine
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 Wolczuk (2004) argues that Ukraine seeks integration with the EU but has been 
unwilling to actually undergo Europeanization by implementing reforms.  Despite Ukraine’s 
economic growth, Wolczuk points to incomplete economic reforms and questions Ukraine’s 
commitment to liberalization.  She cites barriers to market entry and exit, as well as weak 
property rights, laws, and contractual obligations, as evidence of the weak commitment to 
economic liberalization in Ukraine. 
4.  Conclusion 
Clearly, Ukraine strongly desires to become a member of the EU, whereas the EU desires 
for Ukraine to become a member of the EU common market only.  For the EU, the benefits of 
Ukraine joining the common market and joining the EU are almost identical, whereas extending 
membership to the EU entails additional costs.  For this reason, the EU has offered common 
market membership through the ENP but ignored Ukraine’s requests for a membership 
perspective. 
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The greatest possible gains for the Ukraine would likely come about through WTO 
membership.  Beyond WTO membership, the incremental benefit of joining the EU common 
market or the EU itself are far smaller.  Péridy (2005) used a theoretical trade model to estimate 
the export potential of the neighbor states to the EU.  Péridy’s study of trade prospects for the 
ENP demonstrated that the neighborhood states have great export potential; however, this export 
potential changes little whether or not implementation of the acquis is assumed.  Adoption of the 
acquis does not add much to Ukraine’s export potential over the export potential gained simply 
through access to the EU’s restricted market.  Without implementing the Action Plans, neighbor 
states can achieve their export potential through trade liberalization, such as WTO membership 
or implementing an FTA with the EU.  For the neighbor countries, the difficulty of implementing 
the acquis (including both the budgetary costs of overhauling political and economic laws as 
well as the costs of political resistance) may be too great when there is little additional value to 
implementing the acquis compared to achieving market access on other terms.  Although the 
EU’s reasons for requiring adoption of the acquis are clear, doing so imposes a cost on neighbor 
states that is so great that it may make the ENP not worthwhile for states that could achieve 
market access through other means. 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis suggest that the European Neighborhood Policy is 
not an effective foreign policy tool for dealing with Ukraine.  Political reforms are occurring 
very slowly—if at all—in Ukraine, despite the impetus for change from the ENP Action Plan.  
Ukraine is an increasingly global economic actor and is experiencing an improvement in 
economic performance, but this does not appear to be attributable to its adoption of the Action 
Plan.  Scholars doubt whether prospects of a free trade area or membership in the common 
market will provide sufficient incentive to introduce necessary reforms or to gain commitment of 
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both leaders and elites to liberalization (Wolczuk, 2004).  Haukkala (2007) summarizes the 
weaknesses of the ENP: 
“By demanding reforms right now and offering only vague and amorphous incentives somewhere 
down the line, the ENP puts the veritable cart before its neighbours’ horses with no tangible carrot 
in sight.  The material benefits are not strong enough to entice the elites in the new Eastern 
neighbours to change the current system that is skewed in their favour.  But even if the ENP was 
made financially robust enough to act as an economic carrot, it does not answer their calls for 
belonging in full.  A case in point is Ukraine, which has to no avail repeatedly voiced her hopes of 
becoming a full EU member as soon as possible,” (17). 
 
Whereas EU membership might be sufficiently beneficial enough to motivate Ukraine to 
undertake the reforms specified in the Action Plan, the actual benefits of fulfilling the 
Action Plan are below what Ukraine desires. 
Various changes to the ENP could make it a more effective institution for motivating 
reform in Ukraine.  Currently, the Action Plans are extremely vague; setting more concrete 
guidelines for policy change and incorporating these guidelines with Ukraine’s own reform 
priorities could make change more realistic (Raik, 2006).  The institution’s conditionality could 
also be improved by making the link between democratization and assistance clear.  Raik (2006) 
suggests that additional “carrots” such as visa facilitation could be offered as incentive for 
democratic reform.  A clear membership perspective would also legitimize the EU’s role in 
Ukrainian policymaking and provide elites with a strong tool for implementing necessary 
reforms (Wolczuk, 2006; Wolczuk, 2004).  The EU’s role clearly must be to provide pressure as 
well as incentives to Ukraine to adapt, as well as a robust monitoring mechanism. 
The ENP may prove effective in other neighborhood states; because Ukraine has 
expressed such a strong interest in EU membership, a policy without a membership perspective 
may lack sufficient incentives for the Ukraine to reform, though other countries might find 
sufficient motivation to adopt the Action Plan. 
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